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Abstract We consider two variants of the classical Stable Roommates problem with
Incomplete (but strictly ordered) preference lists (SRI) that are degree constrained,
i.e., preference lists are of bounded length. The first variant, EGAL d-SRI, involves
finding an egalitarian stable matching in solvable instances of SRI with preference
lists of length at most d. We show that this problem is NP-hard even if d = 3. On
the positive side we give a 2d+37 -approximation algorithm for d ∈ {3, 4, 5} which
improves on the known bound of 2 for the unbounded preference list case. In the
second variant of SRI, called d -SRTI, preference lists can include ties and are of
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length at most d. We show that the problem of deciding whether an instance of d-
SRTI admits a stable matching is NP-complete even if d = 3. We also consider the
“most stable” version of this problem and prove a strong inapproximability bound
for the d = 3 case. However for d = 2 we show that the latter problem can be solved
in polynomial time.
Keywords Stable matching · Bounded length preference lists · Complexity ·
Approximation algorithm
1 Introduction
In the Stable Roommates problem with Incomplete lists (SRI), a graph G = (A,E)
and a set of preference lists O are given, where the vertices A = {a1, . . . , an} corre-
spond to agents, and O = {≺1, . . . ,≺n}, where ≺i is a linear order on the vertices
adjacent to ai in G (1 ≤ i ≤ n). We refer to ≺i as ai’s preference list. The agents that
are adjacent to ai in G are said to be acceptable to ai . If aj and ak are two acceptable
agents for ai where aj ≺i ak then we say that ai prefers aj to ak .
Let M be a matching in G. If aiaj ∈ M then we let M(ai) denote aj . An edge
aiaj /∈ M blocks M , or forms a blocking edge of M , if ai is unmatched or prefers
aj to M(ai), and similarly aj is unmatched or prefers ai to M(aj ). A matching is
called stable if no edge blocks it. Denote by SR the special case of SRI in which
G = Kn. Gale and Shapley [9] observed that an instance of SR need not admit a
stable matching. Irving [15] gave a linear-time algorithm to find a stable matching or
report that none exists, given an instance of SR. The straightforward modification of
this algorithm to the SRI case is described in [12]. We call an SRI instance solvable if
it admits a stable matching.
In practice agents may find it difficult to rank a large number of alternatives in
strict order of preference. One natural assumption, therefore, is that preference lists
are short, which corresponds to the graph being of bounded degree. Given an inte-
ger d ≥ 1, we define d-SRI to be the restriction of SRI in which G is of bounded
degree d. This special case of SRI problem has potential applications in organising
tournaments. As already pointed out in a paper of Kujansuu et al. [18], SRI can model
a pairing process similar to the Swiss system, which is used in large-scale chess com-
petitions. The assumption on short lists is reasonable, because according to the Swiss
system, players can be matched only to other players with approximately the same
score.
A second variant of SRI, which can be motivated in a similar fashion, arises if we
allow ties in the preference lists, i.e., ≺i (1 ≤ i ≤ n) is now a strict weak ordering.
That is, ≺i is a strict partial order in which incomparability is transitive. We refer
to this problem as the Stable Roommates problem with Ties and Incomplete lists
(SRTI) [17]. As in the SRI case, define d-SRTI to be the restriction of SRTI in which
G is of bounded degree d. Denote by SRT the special case of SRTI in which G =
Kn. In the context of the motivating application of chess tournament construction as
mentioned in the previous paragraph, d-SRTI is naturally obtained if a chess player
has several potential partners of the same score and match history in the tournament.
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In the SRTI context, ties correspond to indifference in the preference lists. In par-
ticular, if aiaj ∈ E and aiak ∈ E where aj ≺i ak and ak ≺i aj then ai is said to
be indifferent between aj and ak . Thus preference in the SRI context corresponds to
strict preference in the case of SRTI. Relative to the strict weak orders in O, we can
define stability in SRTI instances in exactly the same way as for SRI. This means, for
example, that if aiaj ∈ M for some matching M , and ai is indifferent between aj
and some agent ak , then aiak cannot block M . The term solvable can be defined in
the SRTI context in an analogous fashion to SRI. Using a highly technical reduction
from a restriction of 3-SAT, Ronn [23] proved that the problem of deciding whether
a given SRT instance is solvable is NP-complete. A simpler reduction was given by
Irving and Manlove [17].
For solvable instances of SRI there can be many stable matchings. Often it is ben-
eficial to work with a stable matching that is fair to all agents in a precise sense [11,
16]. One such fairness concept can be defined as follows. Given two agents ai , aj in
an instance I of SRI, where aiaj ∈ E, let rank(ai, aj ) denote the rank of aj in ai’s
preference list (that is, 1 plus the number of agents that ai prefers to aj ). Let AM
denote the set of agents who are matched in a given stable matching M . (Note that
this set depends only on I and is independent of M by [12, Theorem 4.5.2].) Define
c(M) = ∑ai∈AM rank(ai,M(ai)) to be the cost of M . An egalitarian stable match-
ing is a stable matching M that minimises c(M) over the set of stable matchings in I.
Finding an egalitarian stable matching in SR was shown to be NP-hard by Feder [7].
Feder [7, 8] also gave a 2-approximation algorithm for this problem in the SRI set-
ting. He also showed that an egalitarian stable matching in SR can be approximated
within a factor of α of the optimum if and only if Minimum Vertex Cover can be
approximated within the same factor α. It was proved later that, assuming the Unique
Games Conjecture, Minimum Vertex Cover cannot be approximated within 2− ε for
any ε > 0 [19].
Given an unsolvable instance I of SRI or SRTI, a natural approximation to a stable
matching is a most-stable matching [1]. Relative to a matchingM in I, define bp(M)
to be the set of blocking edges of M and let bp(I) denote the minimum value of
|bp(M ′)|, taken over all matchings M ′ in I. Then M is a most-stable matching in I
if |bp(M)| = bp(I). The problem of finding a most-stable matching was shown to
be NP-hard and not approximable within nk−ε, for any ε > 0, unless P = NP, where
k = 12 if I is an instance of SR and k = 1 if I is an instance of SRT [1].
To the best of our knowledge, there has not been any previous work published on
either the problem of finding an egalitarian stable matching in a solvable instance
of SRI with bounded-length preference lists or the solvability of SRTI with bounded-
length preference lists. This paper provides contributions in both of these directions,
focusing on instances of d-SRI and d-SRTI for d ≥ 2, with the aim of drawing the line
between polynomial-time solvability and NP-hardness for the associated problems in
terms of d.
Our Contribution In Section 2 we study the problem of finding an egalitarian stable
matching in an instance of d-SRI. We show that this problem is NP-hard if d = 3,
whilst there is a straightforward algorithm for the case that d = 2. We then consider
the approximability of this problem for the case that d ≥ 3.We give an approximation
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algorithm with a performance guarantee of 97 for the case that d = 3, 117 if d = 4
and 137 if d = 5. These performance guarantees improve on Feder’s 2-approximation
algorithm for the general SRI case [7, 8]. In Section 3 we turn to d-SRTI and prove that
the problem of deciding whether an instance of 3-SRTI is solvable is NP-complete.
We then show that the problem of finding a most-stable matching in an instance of
d-SRTI is solvable in polynomial time if d = 2, whilst for d = 3 we show that
this problem is NP-hard and not approximable within n1−ε, for any ε > 0, unless
P = NP. Due to various complications, as explained in Section 4, we do not attempt
to define and study egalitarian stable matchings in instances of SRTI. Some open
problems are presented in Section 5. A structured overview of previous results and
our results (marked by ∗) for d-SRI and d-SRTI is contained in Table 1.
Related Work Degree-bounded graphs, most-stable matchings and egalitarian sta-
ble matchings are widely studied concepts in the literature on matching under
preferences [21]. As already mentioned, the problem of finding a most-stable match-
ing has been studied previously in the context of SRI [1]. In addition to the results
surveyed already, the authors of [1] gave anO(mk+1) algorithm to find a matchingM
with |bp(M)| ≤ k or report that no such matching exists, where m = |E| and k ≥ 1
is any integer. Most-stable matchings have also been considered in the context of d-
SRI [4]. The authors showed that, if d = 3, there is some constant c > 1 such that
the problem of finding a most-stable matching is not approximable within c unless
P = NP. On the other hand, they proved that the problem is solvable in polynomial
time for d ≤ 2. The authors also gave a (2d − 3)-approximation algorithm for the
problem for fixed d ≥ 3. This bound was improved to 2d − 4 if the given instance
satisfies an additional condition (namely the absence of a structure called an elitist
odd party). Most-stable matchings have also been studied in the bipartite restriction
of SRI called the Stable Marriage problem with Incomplete lists (SMI) [5, 14]. Since
every instance of SMI admits a stable matching M (and hence bp(M) = ∅), the focus
in [5, 14] was on finding maximum cardinality matchings with the minimum number
of blocking edges.
Regarding the problem of finding an egalitarian stable matching in an instance of
SRI, as already mentioned Feder [7, 8] showed that this problem is NP-hard, though
approximable within a factor of 2. A 2-approximation algorithm for this problem was
also given independently by Gusfield and Pitt [13], and by Teo and Sethuraman [26].
Table 1 Summary of results for d-SRI and d-SRTI
Finding a stable matching finding an egalitarian stable matching
d-SRI in P [12, 15] in P for d = 2 (∗)
NP-hard even for d = 3 (∗)
2d+3
7 -approximation for d ∈ {3, 4, 5} (∗)
2-approximation for d ≥ 6 [7, 8]
d -SRTI in P for d = 2 (∗)
NP-hard even for d = 3 (∗) not well-defined (see Section 4)
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These approximation algorithms can also be extended to the more general setting
where we are given a weight function on the edges, and we seek a stable matching
of minimum weight. Feder’s 2-approximation algorithm requires monotone, non-
negative and integral edge weights, whereas with the help of LP techniques [25, 26],
the integrality constraint can be dropped, while the monotonicity constraint can be
partially relaxed. Chen et al. [6] study the fixed-parameter tractability of computing
egalitarian stable matchings in the setting of SRTI.
2 The Egalitarian Stable Roommates Problem
In this section we consider the complexity and approximability of the problem of
computing an egalitarian stable matching in instances of d-SRI. We begin by defining
the following problems.
Problem 1 EGAL d -SRI
Input: A solvable instance I = 〈G,O〉 of d-SRI, where G is a graph and O is a set
of preference lists, each of length at most d.
Output: An egalitarian stable matching M in I.
The decision version of EGAL d -SRI is defined as follows:
Problem 2 EGAL d -SRI DEC
Input: I = 〈G,O,K ′〉, where 〈G,O〉 is a solvable instance I ′ of d-SRI and K ′ is
an integer.
Question: Does I ′ admit a stable matching M with c(M) ≤ K ′?
In the following we give a reduction from the NP-complete decision version of
Minimum Vertex Cover in cubic graphs to EGAL 3-SRI DEC, deriving the hardness
of the latter problem.
Theorem 1 EGAL 3-SRI DEC is NP-complete.
Proof Clearly EGAL 3-SRI DEC belongs to NP. To show NP-hardness, we begin by
defining the NP-complete problem that we will reduce to EGAL 3-SRI DEC.
Problem 3 3-VC
Input: I = 〈G,K〉, where G is a cubic graph and K is an integer.
Question: Does G contain a vertex cover of size at most K?
3-VC is NP-complete [10, 20].
Construction of the EGAL 3-SRI DEC Instance Let 〈G,K〉 be an instance of 3-VC,
whereG = (V ,E),E = {e1, . . . , em} and V = {v1, . . . , vn}. For each i (1 ≤ i ≤ n),
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Fig. 1 Notation derived from the 3-VC instance 〈G,K〉
suppose that vi is incident to edges ej1 , ej2 and ej3 in G, where without loss of
generality j1 < j2 < j3. Define ei,s = ejs (1 ≤ s ≤ 3). Similarly for each j
(1 ≤ j ≤ m), suppose that ej = vi1vi2 , where without loss of generality i1 < i2.
Define vj,r = vir (1 ≤ r ≤ 2). The use of this notation is illustrated in Fig. 1.
We now construct an instance I of 3-SRI as follows. We define the following sets
of vertices.
V ′ = {vri : 1 ≤ i ≤ n ∧ 1 ≤ r ≤ 4}
E′ = {esj : 1 ≤ j ≤ m ∧ 1 ≤ s ≤ 2}
W = {wri : 1 ≤ i ≤ n ∧ 1 ≤ r ≤ 4}
Z = {zri : 1 ≤ i ≤ n ∧ 1 ≤ r ≤ 4}
Intuitively, vri ∈ V ′ corresponds to vertex vi and its incident edge ei,r , whilst
esj ∈ E′ corresponds to edge ej and its incident vertex vj,s . The set V ′ ∪E′ ∪W ∪Z
constitutes the set of agents in I, and the preference lists of the agents are as shown
in Fig. 2. In the preference list of an agent vri (1 ≤ i ≤ n and 1 ≤ r ≤ 3), the symbol
Fig. 2 Part of the constructed instance of EGAL 3-SRI DEC
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e(vri ) denotes the agent e
s
j ∈ E′ such that ej = ei,r and vi = vj,s (that is, ej is the
rth edge incident to vi and vi is the sth end-vertex of ej ). Similarly in the preference
list of an agent esj (1 ≤ i ≤ m and 1 ≤ s ≤ 2), the symbol v(esj ) denotes the agent
vri ∈ V ′ such that vi = vj,s and ej = ei,r (that is, vi is the sth end-vertex of ej and
ej is the rth edge incident to vi).
Finally we define some further notation in I. Let K ′ = 7m + 19n + K . The
following edge sets play a particular role in our proof. Addition is taken modulo 4
here.
V ci = {vri wri : 1 ≤ i ≤ n ∧ 1 ≤ r ≤ 4}
V ui = {vri wr+1i : 1 ≤ i ≤ n ∧ 1 ≤ r ≤ 4}
E1j = {e1j e2j , e3j e4j : 1 ≤ j ≤ m}
E2j = {e1j e4j , e2j e3j : 1 ≤ j ≤ m}
MZ = {z1i z2i , z3i z4i : 1 ≤ i ≤ n}
This finishes the construction of the EGAL 3-SRI DEC instance I. In the remainder
of the proof we show that G has a vertex cover C where |C| ≤ K if and only if I has
a stable matching M where c(M) ≤ K ′.
Claim 2 If G has a vertex cover C such that |C| = k ≤ K , then there is a stable
matching M in I such that c(M) ≤ K ′.
Proof Suppose that G has a vertex cover C such that |C| = k ≤ K . We construct
a matching M in I as follows. For each i (1 ≤ i ≤ n), if vi ∈ C, add V ci to M ,
otherwise add V ui toM . For each j (1 ≤ j ≤ m), if vj,1 ∈ C, addE2j toM , otherwise
add E1j to M . Finally add the pairs in MZ to M .
We now argue that M is stable. Suppose that e1j e
4
j ∈ M for some j (1 ≤ j ≤ m).
Then E2j ⊆ M , so vj,1 ∈ C. Let vi = vj,1. Then by construction, V ci ⊆ M , and
hence vri has his first choice for each r (1 ≤ r ≤ 4). Thus e1j does not form a blocking
edge of M with v(e1j ). The argument is similar if e
1
j e
2
j ∈ M for some j (1 ≤ j ≤ m).
Then E1j ⊆ M , so vj,2 ∈ C. Let vi = vj,2. Then by construction, V ci ⊆ M , and
hence vri has his first choice for each r (1 ≤ r ≤ 4). Thus e2j does not form a block-
ing edge of M with v(e1j ). Now suppose that v
r
i w
r+1
i ∈ M for some i (1 ≤ i ≤ n)
and r (1 ≤ r ≤ 3). Then V ui ⊆ M , so vi /∈ C. Let esj = e(vri ). If s = 1 then
vi = vj,1. Hence by construction of M , E1j ⊆ M . Then e1j has his first-choice part-
ner, so vri does not block M with e(v
r
i ). If s = 2 then vi = vj,2. As vj,2 /∈ C, it
follows that vj,1 ∈ C as C is a vertex cover. Hence by construction of M , E2j ⊆ M .
Then e2j has its first-choice partner, so v
r
i does not block M with e(v
r
i ). It is straight-
forward to verify that M cannot admit any other type of blocking edge, and thus M is
stable in I.
Clearly every agent in I is matched in M . We note that Theorem 4.5.2 of [12]
implies that every stable matching in I matches every agent in I – we will use this
fact in the next claim. We finally note that c(M) = 4k + 12k + 9(n − k) + 2(n −
k) + 4(n − k) + 7m + 4n = 7m + 19n + k ≤ K ′, considering the contributions
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from the agents matched in V ci , V
u
i (1 ≤ i ≤ n), E1j , E2j (1 ≤ j ≤ m) and MZ
respectively.
Claim 3 If there is a stable matching M in I such that c(M) ≤ K ′ then G has a
vertex cover C such that |C| = k ≤ K .
Proof Suppose that M is a stable matching in I such that c(M) ≤ K ′. We construct
a set of vertices C in G as follows. As M matches every agent in I, then for each i
(1 ≤ i ≤ n), either V ci ⊆ M or V ui ⊆ M . In the former case add vi to C. Also, for
each j (1 ≤ j ≤ m), as M matches every agent in I, either E1j ⊆ M or E2j ⊆ M .
Finally, it follows that MZ ⊆ M .
We now argue that C is a vertex cover. Let j (1 ≤ j ≤ m) be given and suppose
that vj,1 /∈ C and vj,2 /∈ C. Suppose firstly that E1j ⊆ M . Let vi = vj,2. Then
V ui ⊆ M by construction of C, so that e2j blocks M with v(e2j ), a contradiction. Now
suppose that E2j ⊆ M . Let vi = vj,1. Then V ui ⊆ M by construction of C, so that e1j
blocks M with v(e1j ), a contradiction. Hence C is a vertex cover in G.
Moreover if k = |C| then given the composition of M , as noted in the previous
claim, c(M) = 7m + 19n + k, and since c(M) ≤ K ′ it follows that k ≤ K .
Theorem 1 immediately implies the following result.
Corollary 4 EGAL 3-SRI is NP-hard.
We remark that EGAL 2-SRI is trivially solvable in polynomial time: the compo-
nents of the graph are paths and cycles in this case, and the cost of a stable matching
selected in one component is not affected by the matching edges chosen in another
component. Therefore we can deal with each path and cycle separately, minimising
the cost of a stable matching in each. Paths and odd cycles admit exactly one sta-
ble matching (recall that (i) the instance is assumed to be solvable, and (ii) the set of
matched agents is the same in all stable matchings [12, Theorem 4.5.2]), whilst even
cycles admit at most two stable matchings (to find them, test each of the two perfect
matchings for stability) – we can just pick the stable matching with lower cost in such
a case. The following result is therefore immediate.
Proposition 5 EGAL 2-SRI admits a linear-time algorithm.
Corollary 4 naturally leads to the question of the approximabilty of EGAL d -SRI.
As mentioned in the Introduction, Feder [7, 8] provided a 2-approximation algorithm
for the problem of finding an egalitarian stable matching in an instance of SRI. As
Theorems 6, 8 and 10 show, this bound can be improved for instances with bounded-
length preference lists.
Theorem 6 EGAL 3-SRI is approximable within 9/7.
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Proof Let I be an instance of 3-SRI and let Megal denote an egalitarian stable match-
ing in I. First we show that any stable matching in I is a 4/3-approximation toMegal.
We then focus on the worst-case scenario when this ratio 4/3 is in fact realised.
Then we design a weight function on the edges of the graph and apply Teo and
Sethuraman’s 2-approximation algorithm [25, 26] to find an approximate solution
M ′ to a minimum weight stable matching Mopt for this weight function. This weight
function helps M ′ to avoid the worst case for the 4/3-approximation for a signif-
icant amount of the matching edges. We will ultimately show that M ′ is in fact a
9/7-approximation to Megal.
Claim 7 In an instance of EGAL 3-SRI, any stable matching approximates c(Megal)
within a factor of 4/3.
Proof Let M be an arbitrary stable matching in I. Call an edge uv an (i, j)-pair
(i ≤ j) if v is u’s ith choice and u is v’s j th choice. By Theorem 4.5.2 of [12], the
set of agents matched in Megal is identical to the set of agents matched in M . We
will now study the worst approximation ratios in all cases of (i, j)-pairs, given that
1 ≤ i ≤ j ≤ 3 in 3-SRI.
• If uv ∈ Megal is a (1, 1)-pair then u and v contribute 2 to c(Megal) and also 2 to
c(M) since they must be also be matched in M (and in every stable matching).
• If uv ∈ Megal is a (1, 2)-pair then u and v contribute 3 to c(Megal) and at most
4 to c(M). Since, if uv /∈ M , then v must be matched to his 1st choice and u to
his 2nd or 3rd, because one of u and v must be better off and the other must be
worse off in M than in Megal.
• If uv ∈ Megal is a (1, 3)-pair then u and v contribute 4 to c(Megal) and at most 5
to c(M). Since, if uv /∈ M , then v must be matched to his 1st or 2nd choice and
u to his 2nd or 3rd.
• If uv ∈ Megal is a (2, 2)-pair then u and v contribute 4 to c(Megal) and at most 4
to c(M). Since, if uv /∈ M , then one must be matched to his 1st choice and the
other to his 3rd.
• If uv ∈ Megal is a (2, 3)-pair then u and v contribute 5 to c(Megal) and at most 5
to c(M). Since, if uv /∈ M , then v must be matched to his 1st or 2nd choice and
u to his 3rd.
• If uv ∈ Megal is a (3,3)-pair then u and v contribute 6 to c(Megal) and also 6 to
c(M) since they must be also be matched in M (and in every stable matching –
this follows by [12, Lemma 4.3.9]).
It follows that, for every pair uv ∈ Megal,
rank(u,M(u)) + rank(v,M(v))
rank(u,Megal(u)) + rank(v,Megal(v)) =
rank(u,M(u)) + rank(v,M(v))
rank(u, v) + rank(v, u)
≤ 4/3.
Hence c(M)/c(Megal) ≤ 4/3 and Claim 7 is proved.
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As shown in Claim 7, the only case when the approximation ratio 4/3 is reached
is where Megal consists of (1,2)-pairs exclusively, while the stable matching output
by the approximation algorithm contains (1,3)-pairs only. We will now present an
algorithm that either delivers a stable solution M ′ containing at least a significant
amount of the (1,2)-pairs in Megal or a certificate that Megal contains only a few
(1,2)-pairs and thus any stable solution is a good approximation.
To simplify our proof, we execute some basic pre-processing of the input graph.
If there are any (1,1)-pairs in G, then these can be fixed, because they occur in every
stable matching and thus can only lower the approximation ratio. Similarly, if an
arbitrary stable matching contains a (3,3)-pair, then this edge appears in all stable
matchings and thus we can fix it. Those (3,3)-pairs that do not belong to the set of sta-
ble edges can be deleted from the graph. From this point on, we assume that no edge
is ranked first or last by both of its end vertices in G and prove the approximation
ratio for such graphs.
Take the following weight function on all uv ∈ E:
w(uv) =
{
0 if uv is a (1,2)-pair,
1 otherwise.
We designed w(uv) to fit the necessary U-shaped condition of Teo and Sethura-
man’s 2-approximation algorithm [25, 26]. This condition on the weight function is as
follows.We are given a function fp on the neighbouring edges of a vertex p. Function
fp isU-shaped if it is non-negative and there is a neighbour q of p so that fp is mono-
tone decreasing on neighbours in order of p’s preference until q, and fp is monotone
increasing on neighbours in order of p’s preference after q. The approximation guar-
antee of Teo and Sethuraman’s algorithm holds for an edge weight function w(uv) if
for every edge uv ∈ E, w(uv) can be written as w(uv) = fu(uv) + fv(uv), where
fu and fv are U-shaped functions.
Our w(uv) function is clearly U-shaped, because at each vertex the sequence of
edges in order of preference is either monotone increasing or it is (1, 0, 1). Since w
itself is U-shaped, it is easy to decompose it into a sum of U-shaped fv functions, for
example by setting fv(uv) = fu(uv) = w(uv)2 for every edge uv.
Let M denote an arbitrary stable matching, let M(1,2) be the set of (1,2)-pairs in
M , and let Mopt be a minimum weight stable matching with respect to the weight
function w(uv). Since Mopt is by definition the stable matching with the largest num-
ber of (1,2)-pairs, |M(1,2)opt | ≥ |M(1,2)egal |. We also know that w(M) = |M| − |M(1,2)|
for every stable matching M .
Due to Teo and Sethuraman’s approximation algorithm [25, 26], it is possible to
find a stable matching M ′ whose weight approximates w(Mopt) within a factor of 2.
Formally,
|M| − |M ′(1,2)| = w(M ′) ≤ 2w(Mopt) = 2|M| − 2|M(1,2)opt |.
This gives us a lower bound on |M ′(1,2)|.
|M ′(1,2)| ≥ 2|M(1,2)opt | − |M| ≥ 2|M(1,2)egal | − |M| (1)
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We distinguish two cases from here on, depending on the sign of the term on the
right. In both cases, we establish a lower bound on c(Megal) and an upper bound
on c(M ′). These will give the desired upper bound of 9/7 on c(M
′)
c(Megal)
.
1) 2|M(1,2)egal | − |M| ≤ 0
The derived lower bound for |M ′(1,2)| is negative or zero in this case. Yet we
know that at most half of the edges in Megal are (1,2)-pairs, and c(e) ≥ 4 for
the rest of the edges in Megal. Let us denote |M| − 2|M(1,2)egal | ≥ 0 by x. Thus,
|M(1,2)egal | = |M|−x2 .
c(Megal) ≥ |M| − x
2
· 3 + |M| + x
2
· 4 = 3.5|M| + 0.5x (2)
We use our arguments in the proof of Claim 7 to derive that an arbitrary
stable matching approximates c(Megal) on the
|M|−x
2 (1,2)-edges within a ratio
of 43 , while its cost on the remaining
|M|+x
2 edges is at most 5. These imply the
following inequalities for an arbitrary stable matching M .
c(M) ≤ |M| − x
2
· 3 · 4
3
+ |M| + x
2
· 5 = 4.5|M| + 0.5x (3)
We now combine (2) and (3). The last inequality holds for all x ≥ 0.
c(M)
c(Megal)
≤ 4.5|M|+0.5x3.5|M|+0.5x ≤ 97
2) 2|M(1,2)egal | − |M| > 0
Let us denote 2|M(1,2)egal | − |M| by xˆ. Notice that |M(1,2)egal | = xˆ+|M|2 . We can
now express the number of edges with cost 3, and at least 4 in Megal.
c(Megal) ≥ 3 · xˆ + |M|
2
+ 4 ·
(
|M| − xˆ + |M|
2
)
= 3.5|M| − 0.5xˆ (4)
Let |M ′(1,2)| = z1. Then exactly z1 edges in M ′ have cost 3. It follows from (1)
that z1 ≥ xˆ. Suppose that z2 ≤ z1 edges inM ′(1,2) correspond to edges inM(1,2)egal .
Recall that |M(1,2)egal | = xˆ+|M|2 . The remaining |M|+xˆ2 − z2 edges in M(1,2)egal have
cost at most 4 in M ′. This leaves |M| − |M(1,2)egal | − (z1 − z2) = |M|−xˆ2 − z1 + z2
edges in Megal that are as yet unaccounted for; these have cost at most 5 in both
Megal and M ′. We thus obtain:
c(M ′) ≤ 3z1 + 4
( |M| + xˆ
2
− z2
)
+ 5
( |M| − xˆ
2
− z1 + z2
)
= 4.5|M| − 0.5xˆ − 2z1 + z2
≤ 4.5|M| − 1.5xˆ (5)
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Combining (4) and (5) delivers the following bound.
c(M ′)
c(Megal)
≤ 4.5|M|−1.5xˆ3.5|M|−0.5xˆ < 97
The last inequality holds for every xˆ > 0.
We derived thatM ′, the 2-approximate solution with respect to the weight function
w(uv) delivers a 97 -approximation in both cases.
Using analogous techniques we can establish similar approximation bounds for
EGAL 4-SRI and EGAL 5-SRI, as follows.
Theorem 8 EGAL 4-SRI is approximable within 11/7.
Proof We start with a statement analogous to Claim 7.
Claim 9 In an instance of EGAL 4-SRI, any stable matching approximates c(Megal)
within a factor of 5/3.
Proof As earlier, we can fix all (1,1)-pairs and eliminate all (4,4)-pairs from the
instance. Table 2 contains all cases for uv edges in Megal and the corresponding costs
in an arbitrary stable matching.
We define the same weight function w(uv) as in the proof of Theorem 6. We
remark here that w(uv) remains U-shaped for preference lists of length 4, because at
each vertex the sequence of edges in order of preference is either monotone increas-
ing or it is (1,0,1,1). Since we derived Inequality (1) without using the bounded
degree property, it holds for EGAL 4-SRI as well. We distinguish two cases based on
the sign of 2|M(1,2)egal | − |M|.
1) 2|M(1,2)egal | − |M| ≤ 0
Table 2 uv edges and the corresponding costs in EGAL 4-SRI
uv Worst case cost at u Worst case cost at v Cost ratio
(1,2) 4 1 5/3
(1,3) 4 2 6/4
(1,4) 4 3 7/5
(2,2) 4 1 5/4
(2,3) 4 2 6/5
(2,4) 4 3 7/6
(3,3) 4 2 6/6
(3,4) 4 3 7/7
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Let us denote |M|−2|M(1,2)egal | ≥ 0 by x. Thus, |M(1,2)egal | = |M|−x2 . Furthermore,
let y denote the number of edges with cost at least 5 in Megal.
c(Megal) ≥ |M| − x
2
· 3 +
( |M| + x
2
− y
)
· 4 + 5y
= 3.5|M| + 0.5x + y
c(M) ≤ |M| − x
2
· 3 · 5
3
+
( |M| + x
2
− y
)
· 6 + 7y = 5.5|M| + 0.5x + y
c(M)
c(Megal)
≤ 5.5|M|+0.5x+y3.5|M|+0.5x+y ≤ 117
2) 2|M(1,2)egal | − |M| > 0
Let xˆ denote 2|M(1,2)egal | − |M| and y the number of edges with cost at least
5 in Megal. Due to Inequality (1), we know that at least xˆ (1, 2)-pairs in Megal
correspond to edges of cost 3 in M ′. The remaining |M|−xˆ2 (1, 2)-pairs in Megal
correspond to edges of cost at most 5 in M ′.
c(Megal) ≥ xˆ + |M|
2
· 3 + 4 · ( |M| − xˆ
2
− y) + 5y = 3.5|M| − 0.5xˆ + y
c(M ′) ≤ 3xˆ + 5 · |M| − xˆ
2
+ 6 · ( |M| − xˆ
2
− y) + 7y = 5.5|M| − 2.5xˆ + y
c(M ′)
c(Megal)
≤ 5.5|M|−2.5xˆ+y3.5|M|−0.5xˆ+y < 117
Theorem 10 EGAL 5-SRI is approximable within 13/7.
Proof Again we start with a statement analogous to Claim 7.
Claim 11 In an instance of EGAL 5-SRI, any stable matching approximates c(Megal)
within a factor of 2.
Proof As earlier, we can fix all (1,1)-pairs and eliminate all (5,5)-pairs from the
instance. Table 3 contains all cases for uv edges in Megal and the corresponding costs
in an arbitrary stable matching.
We remark that w(uv) remains U-shaped for preference lists of length 5, because
at each vertex the sequence of edges in order of preference is either monotone increas-
ing or it is (1,0,1,1,1). We observe that Inequality (1) holds for EGAL 5-SRI as well.
Thus we distinguish two cases based on the sign of 2|M(1,2)egal | − |M|.
1) 2|M(1,2)egal | − |M| ≤ 0
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Table 3 uv edges and the corresponding costs in EGAL 5-SRI
uv Worst case cost at u Worst case cost at v Cost ratio
(1,2) 5 1 6/3
(1,3) 5 2 7/4
(1,4) 5 3 8/5
(1,5) 5 4 9/6
(2,2) 5 1 6/4
(2,3) 5 2 7/5
(2,4) 5 3 8/6
(2,5) 5 4 9/7
(3,3) 5 2 7/6
(3,4) 5 3 8/7
(3,5) 5 4 9/8
(4,4) 5 3 8/8
(4,5) 5 4 9/9
Let us denote |M|−2|M(1,2)egal | ≥ 0 by x. Thus, |M(1,2)egal | = |M|−x2 . Furthermore,
let y be the number of edges with cost 5 and z the number of edges with cost at
least 6 in Megal.
c(Megal) ≥ |M| − x
2
· 3 +
( |M| + x
2
− y − z
)
· 4 + 5y + 6z
= 3.5|M| + 0.5x + y + 2z
c(M) ≤ |M| − x
2
· 3 · 6
3
+
( |M| + x
2
− y − z
)
· 7 + 8y + 9z
= 6.5|M| + 0.5x + y + 2z
c(M)
c(Megal)
≤ 6.5|M|+0.5x+y+2z3.5|M|+0.5x+y+2z ≤ 137
2) 2|M(1,2)egal | − |M| > 0
Let xˆ denote 2|M(1,2)egal | − |M|, y the number of edges with cost 5 and z the
number of edges with cost at least 6 in Megal.
c(Megal) ≥ xˆ + |M|
2
·3+4·( |M| − xˆ
2
−y−z)+5y+6z = 3.5|M|−0.5xˆ+y+2z
c(M ′) ≤ 3xˆ+6· |M| − xˆ
2
+7·( |M| − xˆ
2
−y−z)+8y+9z = 6.5|M|−3.5xˆ+y+2z
c(M ′)
c(Megal)
≤ 6.5|M|−3.5xˆ+y+2z3.5|M|−0.5xˆ+y+2z < 137
Using a similar reasoning for each d ≥ 6, our approach gives a cd -approxi-
mation algorithm for EGAL d -SRI where cd > 2. In these cases the 2-approximation
algorithm of Feder [7, 8] should be used instead.
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3 Solvability and Most-stable Matchings in d-SRTI
In this section we study the complexity and approximability of the problem of decid-
ing whether an instance of d -SRTI admits a stable matching, and the problem of
finding a most-stable matching given an instance of d -SRTI.
We begin by defining two problems that we will be studying in this section from
the point of view of complexity and approximability.
Problem 4 SOLVABLE d -SRTI
Input: I = 〈G,O〉, where G is a graph and O is a set of preference lists, each of
length at most d, possibly involving ties.
Question: Is I solvable?
Problem 5 MIN BP d -SRTI
Input: An instance I of d-SRTI.s
Output: A matching M in I such that |bp(M)| = bp(I).
We will show that SOLVABLE 3-SRTI is NP-complete and MIN BP 3-SRTI is hard
to approximate. In both cases we will use a reduction from the following satisfiability
problem:
Problem 6 (2,2)-E3-SAT
Input: I = B, where B is a Boolean formula in CNF, in which each clause com-
prises exactly 3 literals and each variable appears exactly twice in unnegated and
exactly twice in negated form.
Question: Is there a truth assignment satisfying B?
(2,2)-E3-SAT is NP-complete, as shown by Berman et al. [2]. We begin with the
hardness of SOLVABLE 3-SRTI.
Theorem 12 SOLVABLE 3-SRTI is NP-complete.
Proof Clearly SOLVABLE 3-SRTI belongs to NP. To show NP-hardness, we reduce
from (2,2)-E3-SAT as defined in Problem 6. Let B be a given instance of (2,2)-E3-
SAT, where X = {x1, x2, . . . , xn} is the set of variables and C = {c1, c2, . . . , cm}
is the set of clauses. We form an instance I = (G,O) of 3-SRTI as follows. Graph
G consists of a variable gadget for each xi (1 ≤ i ≤ n), a clause gadget for each
cj (1 ≤ j ≤ m) and a set of interconnecting edges between them; these different
parts of the construction, together with the preference orderings that constituteO, are
shown in Fig. 3 and will be described in more detail below.
When constructing G, we will keep track of the order of the three literals in each
clause of B and the order of the two unnegated and two negated occurrences of each
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Fig. 3 Clause and variable gadgets for 3-SRTI. The dotted edges are the interconnecting edges. The nota-
tion used for edge a1j v
4
i implies that the first literal of the corresponding clause cj is the second occurrence
of the corresponding variable xi in negated form
variable in B. Each of these four occurrences of each variable is represented by an
interconnecting edge.
A variable gadget for a variable xi (1 ≤ i ≤ n) of B comprises the 4-cycle
〈v1i , v2i , v3i , v4i 〉 with cyclic preferences. Each of these four vertices is incident to an
interconnecting edge. These edges end at specific vertices of clause gadgets. The
clause gadget for a clause cj (1 ≤ j ≤ m) contains 20 vertices, three of which
correspond to the literals in cj ; these vertices are also incident to an interconnecting
edge.
Due to the properties of (2,2)-E3-SAT, xi occurs twice in unnegated form, say in
clauses cj and ck of B. Its first appearance, as the rth literal of cj (1 ≤ r ≤ 3),
is represented by the interconnecting edge between vertex v1i in the variable gadget
corresponding to xi and vertex arj in the clause gadget corresponding to cj . Similarly
the second occurrence of xi , say as the sth literal of ck (1 ≤ s ≤ 3) is represented by
the interconnecting edge between v3i and a
s
k . The same variable xi also appears twice
in negated form. Appropriate a-vertices in the gadgets representing those clauses are
connected to v2i and v
4
i . We remark that this construction involves a gadget similar to
one presented by Biro´ et al. [4] in their proof of the NP-hardness of MIN BP 3-SRI.
Now we prove that there is a truth assignment satisfying B if and only if there is a
stable matching M in I.
Claim 13 For any truth assignment satisfying B, a stable matching M can be
constructed in I.
Proof In Fig. 4, we define two matchings, MTi and M
F
i , on the variable gadgets and
three matchings, M1j ,M
2
j and M
3
j , on the clause gadgets.
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Fig. 4 The matchings corresponding to variable xi if it is set to be true and false, respectively, and to the
first, second or third literal being true in a fixed clause cj
If a variable xi (1 ≤ i ≤ n) is assigned to be true, MTi is added to M , otherwise
MFi is added. Similarly, since at least one literal in cj (1 ≤ j ≤ m) is true, let r
(1 ≤ r ≤ 3) be the minimum integer such that the literal at position r of cj is true;
addMrj toM . The intuition behind this choice is that if a literal is true, then the vertex
representing it in the variable gadget is matched to its best choice. On the other hand,
if some literals in a clause are true, then the vertex representing the appearance of
one of them in that clause is matched to its last-choice vertex.
We claim that no edge blocks M . Checking the edges in the clause and variable
gadgets is easy. The five special matchings were designed in such a way that no edge
within the gadgets blocks them. More explanation is needed regarding the intercon-
necting edges. Suppose one of them, arj v
s
i , (r ∈ {1, 2, 3} , s ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}) blocks M .
Since M is a perfect matching, arj needs to be matched to its last choice, a q-vertex.
Similarly, vsi has to be matched to its worst partner. While the partner of a
r
j indi-
cates that the literal represented by vsi (xi or x¯i) is true in the clause, the partner of v
s
i
means that the literal is false.
Claim 14 For any stable matching M in I, there is a truth assignment satisfying B.
Proof In the next three paragraphs we show that the restriction of M to any variable
or clause gadget is one of the above listed special matchings, and no interconnecting
edge is in M .
First of all, if a vertex u is the only first choice of another vertex, then u certainly
needs to be matched in M . This property is fulfilled for all vertices of all clause
gadgets except for y3j and z
3
j for each cj (1 ≤ j ≤ m). Let us first study clause
gadget cj . If y4j is matched to y
2
j , then y
2
j y
3
j blocks M . Thus, y
3
j y
4
j , and similarly,
z3j z
4
j are part of M for all clause gadgets.
Our proof for clause gadgets from this point involves considering matchings cov-
ering all twelve remaining vertices. We differentiate two possible cases, depending
on the partner of p3j . In the first case, p
3
j b
3
j ∈ M . Therefore, p2jp1j ∈ M too, because
p2j has to be matched. For similar reasons, {b1j a1j , b2j a2j , q1j q2j , q3j a3j } ⊆ M . This gives
us matching M3j . In the second case, if p
3
j is matched to p
2
j , then {b3j a3j , q3j q2j } ⊆ M .
There are two possible matchings on the remaining six vertices: {p1j b1j , a1j q1j , b2j a2j }
and {p1j b2j , q1j a2j , b1j a1j }. These two matchings together with the lower part of the
gadget form M1j and M
2
j .
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Since all a-vertices have a partner within their clause gadgets, no interconnecting
edge can be a part of M . For the variable gadgets, it is straightforward to see that MTi
and MFi are the only matchings covering all vertices of the 4-cycles.
The truth assignment to B is then defined in the following way. Each variable
whose gadget has the edges of MTi in M is assigned to be true, while all other
variables with MFi on their gadgets are false.
All that remains is to show that this is indeed a truth assignment. Suppose that
there is an unsatisfied clause cj in B. Since all three of cj ’s literals are false, every
vertex vri (1 ≤ i ≤ n) such that vri asj is an interconnecting edge prefers asj to its
partner in M (1 ≤ s ≤ 3). Hence a blocking edge can only be avoided if a1j b1j , a2j b2j
and a3j b
3
j are all in M , which never occurs in any stable matching as shown above.
This finishes the proof of Theorem 12.
Our construction shows that the complexity result holds even if the preference lists
are either strictly ordered or consist of a single tie of length two. Moreover, Theorem
12 also immediately implies the following result.
Corollary 15 MIN BP 3-SRTI is NP-hard.
The following result strengthens Corollary 15.
Theorem 16 MIN BP 3-SRTI is not approximable within n1−ε, for any ε > 0, unless
P = NP, where n is the number of agents.
Proof The core idea of the proof is to gather several copies of the 3-SRTI instance
created in the proof of Theorem 12, together with a small unsolvable 3-SRTI instance.
By doing so, we create a MIN BP 3-SRTI instance I in which bp(I) is large if the
Boolean formula B (originally given as an instance of (2,2)-E3-SAT) is not satis-
fiable, and bp(I) = 1 otherwise. Therefore, finding a good approximation for I
will imply a polynomial-time algorithm to decide the satisfiability of B. Our proof
is similar to that of an analogous inapproximabilty result for the problem of find-
ing a most-stable matching in an instance of the Hospitals / Residents problem with
Couples [3].
The smallest unsolvable instance of 3-SRTI is a 3-cycle with cyclic strict prefer-
ences. Aside from this, we add k disjoint copies of 3-SRTI instance created in the
proof of Theorem 12 (from the same Boolean formula B), for large enough k. In par-
ticular we let c = 2/ε and k = nc0, where n0 is the number of variables in B. We
use m0 to denote the number of clauses in B. Let I be the instance of 3-SRTI that
has been constructed. Due to the proof of Theorem 12 above, if B is satisfiable then
bp(I) = 1, and if B is not satisfiable then bp(I) ≥ k + 1. Hence a k-approximation
algorithm for MIN BP 3-SRTI could be used to solve (2,2)-E3-SAT in polynomial
time.
In the remainder of the proof we show that n1−ε ≤ k, where n is the number of
agents in I, which will imply the statement of the theorem. With Inequalities (6)–(9)
we give an upper bound for n. This is used in Inequalities (11)–(14) as we establish
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k as an upper bound for n1−ε. Explanations for the steps are given as and when it is
necessary after each set of inequalities.
n = k(4n0 + 20m0) + 3 (6)
= k(4n0 + 204n0
3
) + 3 (7)
≤ 32kn0 (8)
= 32nc+10 (9)
In Equality (6) can be deduced by inspection of the 3-SRTI instance constructed
in the proof of Theorem 12. In step (7) we substitute m0 = 4n03 , which follows from
the structure of B. We can assume without loss of generality that kn0 ≥ 3, which we
use in Inequality (8). Finally, in Equality (9) we substitute k = nc0.
Since c = 2/ε, the following inequality also holds.
c − 1
c + 1 = 1 −
2
c + 1 ≥ 1 − ε (10)
We can now establish the desired upper bound for n1−ε.
n1−ε ≤ nc−1c+1 (11)
≤ 32 c−1c+1 nc−10 (12)
≤ nc0 (13)
= k (14)
Inequality (11) is obtained by raising n to the power of each side of Inequality (10).
Inequality (12) follows from the bound for n established in Inequalities (6)–(9). Now
in Inequality (13) we can assume without loss of generality that n0 ≥ 32 and use that
c−1
c+1 < 1. In the last step, we use the definition of k.
To complete the study of cases of MIN BP d -SRTI, we establish a positive result
for instances with degree at most 2.
Theorem 17 MIN BP 2-SRTI is solvable in O(|V |) time.
Proof For an instance I of MIN BP 2-SRTI, clearly every component of the underly-
ing graph G is a path or cycle. We claim that bp(I) equals the number of odd parties
in G, where an odd party is a cycle C = 〈v1, v2, ..., vk〉 of odd length, such that vi
strictly prefers vi+1 to vi−1 (addition and subtraction are taken modulo k).
Since an odd party never admits a stable matching, bp(I) is bounded below by
the number of odd parties [24]. This bound is tight: by taking an arbitrary maximum
matching in an odd party component, a most-stable matching is already reached. Now
we show that a stable matching M can be constructed in all other components.
Each component that is not an odd cycle is therefore a bipartite subgraph (indeed
either a path or an even cycle). Such a subgraph therefore gives rise to the restriction
of SRTI called the Stable Marriage problem with Ties and Incomplete lists (SMTI).
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An instance of SMTI always admits a stable solution and it can be found in linear
time [22]. Thus these components contribute no blocking edge.
Regarding odd-length cycles that are not odd parties, we will show that there is at
least one vertex not strictly preferred by either of its adjacent vertices. Leaving this
vertex uncovered and adding a perfect matching in the rest of the cycle results in a
stable matching.
Assume that every vertex along a cycle Ck (where k is an odd number) is strictly
preferred by at least one of its neighbours. Since each of the k vertices is strictly
preferred by at least one vertex, and a vertex v can prefer at most one other vertex
strictly, every vertex along Ck has a strictly ordered preference list. Now every vertex
can point at its unique first-choice neighbour. To avoid an odd cycle, there must
be a vertex pointed at by both of its neighbours. This implies that there is also a
vertex v pointed at by no neighbour, and v is hence ranked second by both of its
neighbours.
4 Egalitarian Stable Matchings in SRTI
In this section we outline the difficulties one encounters when attempting to define
and study the concept of an egalitarian stable matching in instances of SRTI.
• When considering the approximability of EGAL d -SRI, we restricted attention
to the case of solvable instances, in the knowledge that solvability can be deter-
mined in linear time [15]. However in the case of SRTI, we can no longer assume
this, since SOLVABLE 3-SRTI is NP-complete as Theorem 12 shows.
• In instances of EGAL d -SRI, not all agents are necessarily matched in all stable
matchings, but due to Theorem 4.5.2 of [12], which states that the same agents
are matched in all stable matchings, we can discard unmatched agents and con-
sider only the remaining agents when reasoning about approximation algorithms.
There is no analogue of Theorem 4.5.2 in the case of d-SRTI (indeed, stable
matchings can be of different sizes in a given instance of SRTI [17]). This means
that any approximation algorithm for the problem of finding an egalitarian stable
matching in an instance of SRTI would need to consider the cost of an unmatched
agent in a given stable matching, and the choice of value for such a case is not
universally agreed upon in the literature. Chen et al. [6] study the fixed-parameter
tractability of EGAL SRTI under different choices of cost value for an unmatched
agent, namely 0, some positive constant and the length of its preference list.
• Similarly in the case of SRTI, the choice of value for the rank of an agent aj
in a given agent ai’s preference list is again not universally agreed upon – for
example if ai has a tie of length 2 at the head of his preference list, followed
strictly by aj , then rank(ai, aj ) could reasonably be defined to be either 2 or 3
depending on the definition adopted. In most competitions, everybody in the tie
receives the rank that directly follows the number of agents ranked strictly higher
than them, which would be 3 in the previous example. On the other hand, setting
the rank to the number of ties (of any cardinality) in the list up to the current tie
is the correct way of dealing with this issue in markets where agents rank their
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possible partners into well-separated tiers and the cardinalities of these do not
matter as much as the tier they end up being matched to – this principle assigns
2 to rank(ai, aj ) in the example above.
5 Open Questions
Theorems 6, 8 and 10 improve on the best known approximation factor for EGAL d -
SRI for small d. It remains open to come up with an even better approximation or
to establish an inapproximability bound matching our algorithm’s guarantee. A more
general direction is to investigate whether the problem of finding a minimum weight
stable matching can be approximated within a factor less than 2 for instances of d-SRI
for small d. Finally, the various alternatives regarding the definition of an egalitarian
stable matching in instances of SRTI open the gate to a number of questions.
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